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In this paper we present a rare empirical study on the determinants of tax filing compliance in the 
United States using county and state level data from 2000 to 2006.  As well as including 
explanatory variables identified in the rational compliance framework such as audit and penalty 
rates, we examine the role of social capital on tax compliance.  In particular, we test whether 
county level heterogeneity in income, language, race and religion can explain variation in filing 
rates.  While several issues are not yet addressed in this preliminary analysis (such as censoring, 
endogeneity between audit and non-filing rates, and people’s self-selection to county), our 
preliminary findings are that non-filing rates are falling in the enforcement rate, rising in the 
penalty rate for income reporting noncompliance, and rising in home-ownership and 
unemployment rates.  Regarding heterogeneity, non-filing rates do not seem to covary with 
household income inequality or home language fragmentation, but increase with racial 
fragmentation.    
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1. Introduction 
  The last decade has seen a steady rise in studies identifying a negative correlation, and 
possibly causation, between measures of social or income heterogeneity and various indicators of 
“social capital”.  Social capital is defined by Putnam (2007) as people’s beliefs and actions that 
contribute to “…social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness”.   
The dimensions of heterogeneity studied for their effect on social capital have included race or 
ethnicity, income, education, birthplace, first language, and religion.  Studies have measured 
social capital using indicators such as people’s propensity to volunteer, vote, be members of 
organizations, contribute to fundraisers, trust others, or support welfare programs (Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2000, 2002; Costa and Kahn 2003a, 2003b; Putnam 2007; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; 
Clark and Kim 2011; Leigh 2006; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Luttmer 2001).   Other studies 
have found government responses to heterogeneity that are consistent with a negative 
relationship between social heterogeneity and social capital.  For example, Poterba (1997) finds 
that the negative relationship between U.S. state-level per-child education spending and the 
proportion of elderly in the state is exacerbated when the elderly are predominantly from a 
different racial group than the school-aged population.  Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) find 
that increased racial heterogeneity reduces local government provision of core public goods such 
as roads, sewerage and education.   This paper examines the impact of heterogeneity on a largely 
unexamined issue: tax compliance.  We make two principle contributions.  First, we examine the 
effect of social heterogeneity on a compulsory rather than voluntary indicator of social capital, 
tax filing compliance behavior.  Second, we provide a rare empirical study on the determinants 
of actual tax filing compliance, using data derived from individual filing decisions. 2 
 
Perhaps for reasons of data availability, most studies that have looked at heterogeneity’s 
effects on social capital have concentrated on indicators of people’s voluntary beliefs and 
actions.  Few studies have tested for links between heterogeneity and indicators of people’s 
compulsory actions.  A rare example is Vigdor (2004), who finds that households’ census form 
return rates for the 2000 United States census were lower in census tracts that were more 
heterogeneous by race, age, or education. 
  The effect of heterogeneity on the broader compulsory area of tax compliance has been 
examined in a much more limited fashion, owing to the very limited amount of compliance data 
available to researchers, especially data that is based in some way on individual decisions.  Three 
studies have used aggregate data on indirect measures of compliance, making cross-national 
comparisons of perceived tax compliance or attitudes toward tax compliance based on survey 
data.  La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) both use a national index of tax compliance 
constructed from the 1996 Global Competitiveness Report, and each finds a negative correlation 
between ethnic heterogeneity and compliance across countries.
1  Li (2010) uses World Values 
Survey data on whether cheating on taxes is justifiable, and similarly finds more sympathy for 
non-compliance in countries with greater ethnic heterogeneity.  These aggregate studies 
notwithstanding, we are not aware of any paper that has examined the effects of heterogeneity on 
actual tax compliance, based on individual filing decisions, again because such data are simply 
not widely available.     
  Thus, one contribution of our study is to plug the hole in the heterogeneity and social 
capital literature in the area of actual, individual tax compliance.  We examine the co-variation of 
heterogeneity and tax filing compliance rates in the United States between 2000 and 2006.  We 
                                                      
1   The Global Competitiveness Report relies exclusively on survey data regarding tax evasion, using respondents’ 
agreement with the statement “[t]ax evasion is minimal in your country.” 3 
 
measure compliance with the United States’ federal tax-filing requirements using previously 
unreleased Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on identified non-filers.  In recent years the IRS 
has identified approximately nine million cases annually of those individuals who have either 
stopped filing without clear cause, or for whom third-party income reports indicate filing should 
be expected.
2  With access to these data, we are able to estimate known non-filing rates for 
almost all 3140 counties of the United States, using both a broad measure of the proportion of 
identified non- or late filers, as well as a narrower measure of the proportion of identified non-
filers whom the IRS believes have a high likelihood of still owing a positive amount to the 
federal government.  We can then examine the effect of heterogeneity at either the county or the 
state level on filing non-compliance rates, while controlling for other factors shown in the tax 
compliance literature to predict income tax non-compliance rates (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 
1990; Beron, Tauchen, and Witte 1992; Erard and Ho 2001; Gentry and Kahn 2009).  Based on 
data availability, we examine heterogeneity by race at the county level for all 7 years; we 
examine heterogeneity by language and household income at the county level for 2000 and the 
state level for all 7 years, and we examine heterogeneity by religion at the county level for 2000 
only. 
  The second contribution of our study is to provide a more general investigation of the 
determinants of non-compliance with tax filing requirements in the United States.  The absence 
of compliance data has often limited researchers in their ability to test the various theoretical 
models of compliance using empirical data.  Even when these data have been available, they 
have typically been for reporting non-compliance, using information on individuals who file tax 
returns but do not declare all taxable income (Clotfelter 1983; Beron, Tauchen, and Witte 1992; 
                                                      
2  We say “identified” non-filers, because there likely exist other United States residents who have never filed a tax 
return (when required by law to do so), and for whom the IRS receives no third party (e.g. bank or employer) 
income reports.  These are the “unknown non-filers”, who cannot be addressed by our study. 4 
 
Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1990; Gentry and Kahn 2009).  There are very few studies (empirical 
or theoretical) on the determinants of the logically prior form of filing non-compliance, or 
whether individuals who are required by law to file tax returns in fact file these returns.  Again, 
lack of data on non-filing “ghosts” has largely been responsible for this omission.  One notable 
exception is a study by Erard and Ho (2001), who use data from the IRS Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP).  Erard and Ho (2001) compare 2,195 located non-filers in 1988 
whose delinquent returns were audited, with a sample of 13,500 filers’ audited returns.   Their 
results indicate that the estimated 7.9 million ghosts in the United States in 1988 had income that 
was on average only about half that of filers, and that 43 percent of all non-filers made at least 
some form of prepayment, covering on average about half their income tax liability.  In total, 
Erard and Ho (2001) estimate that non-filers accounted for a modest $7.8 billion in unpaid 
income and self-employment taxes in 1988, representing a tax gap only 15 percent as large as 
that for filers who underreported income.  The one other empirical study on non-filing of which 
we are aware, by Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), examines the effects of IRS audit rates on 
filing compliance as well as on income reporting compliance, using audit data from the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1977-1986.  They find that audit rates are 
positively associated with reporting compliance, but negatively associated with filing rates 
(possibly because they increase incentives to avoid being audited by keeping out of the system 
altogether).  Other than audit rates, Erard and Ho (2001) and Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) 
find evidence that filing rates are affected by self-employment, occupation, education, age, 
unemployment, and  state-level tax burden.  Neither study examines the effect (if any) of 
heterogeneity on filing rates. 5 
 
  The next section discusses our theoretical framework for examining the role of “rational 
compliance” variables as well as heterogeneity on reporting and filing compliance.  We then 
present our data and empirical framework in section 3.  (An Appendix gives details of the data 
construction.)  In section 4 we present our estimation results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Most theoretical analysis of the individual’s tax compliance decision focuses on his or 
her reporting decision, assuming implicitly that the individual has already chosen to file a return.  
This basic theoretical model begins with the economics-of-crime model of Becker (1968), first 
applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).  Here a rational individual is 
viewed as maximizing the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, weighing the benefits of 
successful under-reporting against the risky prospect of detection and punishment.  The 
individual pays taxes because he or she is afraid of getting caught and penalized if some income 
goes unreported.  This “portfolio” approach gives the plausible and productive result that 
compliance depends upon audit rates and fine rates.  Indeed, the central point of this approach is 
that an individual pays taxes because – and only because – of this fear of detection and 
punishment.
3 
More precisely, an individual who has already decided to file a tax return and report 
income must choose the amount of income to report, R, so as to maximize expected utility: 
 
(1) Reporting  Decision:  EU = (1-p) U(I-tR-C) + p U(I-tR-(1+f)t(I-R)-C). 
 
 
                                                      
3  See Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Sandmo 
(2005), and Alm (2011) for comprehensive surveys and discussions of this literature. 6 
 
Here E is the expectation operator, U( ) is the utility function, p is the probability that a tax return 
is selected for audit, I is the individual’s “true” income, t is the tax rate on reported income, f is 
the penalty rate on undeclared taxes, and C is the financial (and time) burden of preparing and 
filing a tax return.  The expected utility in equation (1) is the sum of two terms: the first if the 
individual files a tax return at cost C, reports income R, pays taxes tR, and is not audited with 
probability (1-p), or (1-p) U(I-tR-C); the second if the individual is caught with probability p and 
is forced to pay all taxes on unreported income, or p U(I-tR-(1+f)t(I-R)-C).
4  Optimization of 
equation (1) with respect to R proceeds using standard methods, and comparative statics results 
are easily derived. 
However, the individual’s filing decision is also of interest, and has seldom been 
examined.  Indeed, the traditional portfolio analysis of the reporting decision does not fully 
capture the individual’s filing decision because submitting a tax return with underreported 
liabilities is inherently different from failing to submit a return at all.  To address the filing 
decision, the individual must compare the expected utility from filing with optimal income 
reporting to the expected utility from non-filing.  The risk of audit for non-filing is likely to be 
significantly different from the risk of audit for a return that is “in the system”; similarly, the 
penalty for failing to file a return is likely to be different (and higher) than a penalty imposed on 
detected underreporting.
5  
To address both filing and reporting decisions, we retain but modify the reporting 
framework developed in Erard and Ho (2001), Alm et al. (2010), and Kleven et al. (2011).   
Here, an individual who decides to file a tax return and report income R has expected utility 
                                                      
4 In this framework, we ignore the distinction that is sometimes made between the probability of audit and the 
probability of detection of underreported income; here we assume these are identical. 
5 In practice, in the US, non-filers are generally pursued by IRS through means other than what is technically 
considered an “audit,” but for purposes of this discussion, we use the term “audit” loosely to capture the IRS 
enforcement with respect to non-filers.  7 
 
equal to equation (1).  An individual who chooses not to file a tax return (and so who reports no 
income) has expected utility equal to: 
 
(2) Filing  Decision:  EU = (1-p*) U(I) + p* U(I-(1+f*)tI). 
 
 
Here p* is the probability that an individual with income I who has not filed a return is 
apprehended by an audit, and f* is the penalty imposed on detected non-filers.  Note that p* is 
likely to be different than p, that f* is likely to exceed f, and that an individual who does not file 
a return escapes the filing cost C.  The individual will thus compare the expected utility from 
filing and reporting the optimal R in equation (1), with expected utility from not filing in 
equation (2), and choose the greater.   
This framework can be easily expanded to incorporate other relevant considerations.  We 
focus on three. 
The first is the possibility that the probability of detection for filers depends upon the 
amount of reported income, or p(R).  We assume that p’(R) < 0, so that the probability of audit 
decreases with reported income.  This assumption follows from standard audit procedures in tax 
administrations around the world. 
The second and related consideration is third-party reporting and its effects on the 
probabilities of audit.  A standard feature of nearly all individual income tax systems is that a 
third-party (e.g., the individual’s employer or financial institution) reports the relevant part of an 
individual’s taxable income to the tax authority (and often also withholds income taxes on this 
reported taxable income).  The presence of this information increases significantly the chances 
that an individual who either does not file a return at all or who underreports income on a filed 
return will be detected.  To address this, we can partition true income I between what is subject 8 
 
to third-party reporting, ITPR , and what must be self-reported, ISR.  The audit rate for returns p is 
now assumed to be a function both of reported income R and of income subject to third-party 
reporting ITPR.  More precisely, p(R, ITPR) is assumed to be a non-linear function whose value 
depends upon the relative magnitudes of R and ITPR.  If R<ITPR, then the audit probability will be 
very high because the tax authority knows from third-party information that the individual is 
under-reporting income; when R≥ITPR, then p will be much lower and decreasing rapidly.  The 
presence of third-information also affects the probability of audit for non-filers, or p*, now 
written in the form p*(ITPR).  If the tax authority has any information that an individual has some 
income ITPR but has not filed a tax return, then p* will be very high; in the absence of this 
information, the probability will remain low and will likely be close to 0. 
A third consideration is the role social norms play in individuals’ reporting and filing 
decisions.  The portfolio model (even with the above extensions) focuses entirely on the financial 
considerations of reporting and filing.  However, there is much evidence that individuals are 
influenced by the social context in which they make decisions.  For example, there appears to be 
what may be termed a “social norm” of tax compliance (Elster, 1989).  Although difficult to 
define precisely, a social norm can be distinguished by the feature that it is process-oriented, 
unlike the outcome-orientation of individual rationality.  A social norm therefore represents a 
pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and is therefore sustained in part by 
social approval or disapproval.  Consequently, if others behave according to some socially 
accepted mode of behavior, then the individual will behave appropriately; if others do not so 
behave, then the individual will respond in kind.  The presence of a social norm is consistent 
with a range of conceptual frameworks, whether they rely upon fairness, trust, social customs, 
tax morale, appeals to patriotism or conscience, or feelings of altruism, morality, guilt, and 9 
 
alienation.  Incorporating social norms suggests that, all else equal, an individual will comply as 
long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm (however defined); conversely, if 
noncompliance becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance disappears.
6  Also, to the 
extent that heterogeneity affects social capital in the form of the frequency of people’s 
interactions with others, it may affect social norms regarding compliance, or alternatively the 
weight individuals attach to complying with those norms. 
The simplest way of introducing social norms is to assume that there is a non-pecuniary 
(or psychic) cost associated with evading one’s own tax liability if one is not caught, as captured 
by the variable γ.
7  We posit that the greater is a society’s social capital, the greater is the psychic 
cost to an individual of cheating on his or her tax liability, or γ(Social Capital) with γ'() > 0.  To 
the extent social heterogeneity affects social capital, it would then affect γ, either by changing 
social norms, or the importance individuals assign to abiding by them.  Note that the psychic cost 
associated with cheating arises only if one is cheating and is not caught cheating, as assumed and 
analyzed by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).  Thus, a taxpayer who complies fully experiences no 
change in utility from the psychic cost of evasion. 
 Putting these considerations together, equations (1) and (2) are modified as follows.  The 
reporting decision becomes: 
 
(1)' Reporting  Decision:  EU = (1-p(R)) U(I-tR-C-γ) + p(R) U(I-tR-(1+f)t(I-R)-C), 
 
and similarly the filing decision becomes: 
 
(2)' Filing  Decision:  EU = (1- p*(ITPR)) U(I-γ) + p*(ITPR) U(I-(1+f*)tI). 
                                                      
6  See Cowell and Gordon (1988), Gordon (1989), Myles and Naylor (1996), Kim (2003), Fortin, Lacroix, and 
Villeval (2007), and Traxler (2010) for examples of social interactions theory as applied to tax evasion.  
7 We assume that there is no psychic benefit from paying the tax.  This simplifies the analysis, and may be justified 




As before, the individual must first choose whether or not to file a tax return, by comparing the 
value of expected utility from non-filing in equation (2)' with the expected utility of filing and 
reporting the optimal amount of income R in equation (1)'. 
In the face of these many elements, the impacts on the individual’s compliance decisions of 
variables like the tax rate and income reflect complicated interactions of income and substitution 
effects, and unambiguous comparative statics results often become elusive.  For the enforcement 
variables (e.g., the probabilities of audit and the penalty rates), the comparative statics results are 
more straightforward, indicating that an increase in, say, the audit rate for non-filing decreases the 
payoff to non-filing.  The impact of heterogeneity via social capital and social norms is not clear-
cut, because it would change the psychic cost of cheating in both the reporting (equation (1)') and 
filing decisions (equation (2)').
8 
Regardless, however, it is straightforward to demonstrate in this framework that the 
likelihood of non-filing depends upon an array of fiscal factors, like the probabilities of audit for 
filers and for non-filers, the penalty rates for filers and for non-filers, the tax rate, and income.  The 
composition of income between third party-verified and unverified sources will affect both the 
probability of audits and of detection of non-filing.  Non-filing will also depend upon socio-
demographic variables that proxy for unobserved preferences or costs associated with filing (e.g., 
marital status, education or age).  Finally, of relevance to our work here, heterogeneity may affect 
social capital, and thus either alter social norms regarding compliance, or the weight people place 
on conforming to those norms.  Heterogeneity can be captured by dispersion measures of salient 
                                                      
8  More precisely, recall that an individual compares expected utility in the two cases (or equation (1)’ versus 
equation (2)’).  An increase in the psychic cost lowers expected utility in both bases, by an amount that depends 
upon the product of the probability of non-audit and the marginal utility of income in the relevant state.  In general, 
it is not possible to determine whether this change in expected utility is greater in one case versus the other. 11 
 
characteristics that people notice in those around them, such as income, first language, race or 
religion.  The next section presents our empirical framework for estimating these various impacts.   
 
3. Data and Empirical Specification 
3.1  Data 
  To address the determinants of filing compliance empirically, we have assembled data on 
IRS-identified non-filing rates for counties in the United States for 2000-2006, as well as IRS-
sourced measures of ‘rational compliance’ variables such as audit rates of filed returns, rates of 
enforcement initiated on identified non-filed returns, and effective penalty rates on delinquent 
returns as well as all other tax returns.  To these we have added census and other non-IRS 
variables used in the tax compliance literature to measure income, source of income as it affects 
third party reporting and probability of detection, pecuniary benefits from filing such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, and demographic characteristics to proxy for unobserved preferences 
regarding compliance, as well as social heterogeneity measures.   All variables are described in 
the Appendix, and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1 and 2.  Here we briefly 
summarize the key or unusual variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here.] 
 
  To generate an (identified) non-filing rate, we take the total number of individuals 
identified by the IRS as non-filers for a given tax year (ty), and divide it by the total number of 
individual filers plus non-filers.
9   We construct both a “broad” measure of non-filing that 
includes late-filers, and a “narrow” measure that is restricted to those who do not file and are 
thought to have positive tax owing.  Our broad measure thus attempts to capture all (identifiable) 
                                                      
9  Married jointly filed returns are counted as representing two individuals. 12 
 
non-filers at the cost of including some who may not have needed to file.  Our narrow measure 
attempts to avoid including the ex post “innocent”, at the cost of excluding some of the ex post 
“guilty.”     
  Our measures of audit and penalty rates work as follows.   We define the “audit rate”  of 
filed income tax returns as the number of individual income tax audits initiated in a calendar year 
divided by the number of returns filed in that year (reflecting income earned in the previous 
year).
10  We assume that this audit rate affects the filing decision and therefore the rate of non-
filers in the subsequent calendar year.   We define an “enforcement rate” for (identified) non-
filers as the number of individuals who receive a “delinquent return” notice on their account in a 
given calendar year divided by the number of (broad or narrow) individuals who were identified 
as not filing a return in that year (for income earned in the previous tax year).
11  Again, we 
assume that this non-filer enforcement rate will influence the filing decision made in the 
subsequent year.  
Regarding penalties for non-filing, the IRS imposes a failure-to-file penalty that is 
typically 5 percent of unpaid taxes for each month the return is late, up to a maximum of 25 
percent.  Interest may also be charged on any unpaid tax from the due date of the return.
12 
Despite the stability of the penalty formula over time and across counties, there may still be 
slight variation in effective penalty rates due to abatements, time to detection and thus interest 
charged, and similar considerations.  We thus define a non-filing penalty rate as the ratio of net 
                                                      
10 This is a ratio rather than a “true” audit rate, in which the audits in the numerator would be a subset of the audits 
in the denominator and would be based on the tax year of the return (the year during which the income was earned).  
The timing becomes difficult and perhaps less salient for taxpayer decision-making because audits can be initiated 
up to several years after the filing of the return.  Instead, we define our audit rate as a ratio that captures audit 
activity during a single calendar year.   
11 The establishment of a “delinquent return” on a taxpayer’s account signals the beginning of the enforcement 
process for non-filers, which begins with notices to the taxpayer requesting them to file and, if the taxpayer does not 
comply, eventually leads to a Substitute For Return, where the IRS prepares a return and assesses tax liability based 
on third-party-reported income information. 
12 The interest rate charged is the federal short-term rate plus 3 percent and compounds daily. 13 
 
penalties plus interest charged on delinquent returns, divided by net tax assessed for delinquent 
returns; this is calculated on a fiscal year basis for taxpayers for whom the most recent 
enforcement revenue activity for the delinquent return was in that fiscal year.
13  To provide a 
proxy penalty rate for filers, we use the ratio of net penalties plus interest charged to taxpayers 
for all but delinquent returns, divided by net tax assessed to all taxpayers but delinquent returns.  
Again, this is on a fiscal year basis according to the timing of the most recent enforcement 
revenue activity.  These effective penalty rates are assumed to affect the filing decisions made in 
the following calendar year. 
  It is important to note that all IRS-generated variables (regarding number of non-filers, 
audits, enforcements, or penalties assessed) are censored for counties with fewer than 10 
observations.  For 2000, for example, of 3140 counties, filing rates are available for 96 percent.  
However non-filing enforcement rates are available for only 74 percent, audit filing rates for 84 
percent, and penalty rates (for non filing or incorrectly filed returns) for 98 percent.
14  With 
censoring unaddressed in analysis, those counties that are sparsest in population and/or most law-
abiding may be absent.  
  Other variables thought to influence the filing choice, such as level of income, or 
probability of detection via source of income or occupation, or filing benefits such as eligibility 
for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), are taken from the United States Census of 2000 at 
county level, the American Community Survey (ACS) at state level for 2000 to 2006, and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis at state level, and the Area Resource File at county level.  To 
proxy for eligibility for the EITC, which provides tax credits for low income working households 
                                                      
13 These data come from IRS’ Enforcement Revenue Information System, which tallies activity on a fiscal year 
basis. 
14 Non-filing enforcement rates are available for a higher share of counties in subsequent years, such that for the 
2000-2006 panel overall, 83 percent of county-years are available. 14 
 
that increase in household size, we have included the share of the population in the civilian labor 
force, the unemployment rate, average household size and median household income, and the 
interaction of the household size and income.  Demographic variables thought to proxy for 
unobserved preferences or costs of filing, such as age, sex, marital status, education, language 
spoken at home, stability of residence, home ownership rates, birthplace and race are similarly 
sourced from the census or ACS.  Religious adherence rates at county level are also included for 
2000 only, sourced from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA).  Median (owner-
occupied) home values are also included to proxy for differences in cost of living that affect the 
real cost of income tax.  Finally, following Dubin et al. (1990), we include average state 
individual income tax rates.  Given the information sharing that exists between state and federal 
tax agencies, individuals in high tax states may face higher incentives not to file federal returns. 
  Our last class of variables, heterogeneity measures, are defined as follows.  For language, 
race and religion, we follow the social capital literature in constructing fragmentation measures,  









=− ∑   
That is, a fragmentation index divides a population into n categories.  Each category’s share of 
the population is squared, summed, and subtracted from 1.  (It can be thought of as 1 minus the 
Herfindahl Index of concentration.)  F is bounded between zero (complete homogeneity) and an 
upper bound whose limit is 1 (complete heterogeneity).  The exact upper bound is increasing in 
n.  For language spoken at home, we define FLanguage over 3 categories: English, Spanish, and 
Other.  For race, we define FRace over the 7 categories used in the 2000 census:  White Non-
Hispanic, White Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, Black Hispanic, American Indian/Alaskan 
Native, Asian, and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander.  For religion, we define FReligion using 6 aggregate 
categories of enumerated adherents available from the ARDA:  Mainline Protestant, Evangelical 15 
 
Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Other Religions, and Unclaimed.  Finally, we measure 
the dispersion of household income FIncome, using the Gini coefficient as provided by the census 
and ACS, which like the fragmentation index is bounded between 0 and 1 and increasing in 
heterogeneity. 
  Of our four measures of heterogeneity, the data pertaining to race are the most detailed, 
as population counts (census) or estimates (ARF) are available annually at county level for 2000-
2006.  Our measures of heterogeneity by language spoken at home and household income are 
available at county level for 2000 only, but at state level for 2000-2006.  Finally, our measure of 
heterogeneity by religion is available at county level for 2000 only.  
3.2  Empirical Estimation Strategy        
  To exploit the greater number of explanatory variables available at county level for the 
calendar/tax year 2000, we proceed in two steps.  First, we use a cross section regression of the 
form: 
(4)  ,2000 ,2000 ,2000 ij ij ij yX u β ′ =+ , 
where yij,2000 refers to the (broad or narrow) non-filing rate in county i of state j, and  ,2000 ij X  is a 
vector of county level characteristics and state dummies, and  ,2000 ij u  is a random error.  With 
limited correlations between our four heterogeneity measures, (none exceeding |.54|), we follow 
this with a specification that adds all of them simultaneously, or: 
(4)'  ,2000 ,2000 ,2000 ,2000 ij ij ij ij yX F u β δ ′′ =+ + , 
where  ,2000 ij F is the vector of FIncome, FLanguage, FRace, and FReligion for county i in state j. 
  We then compare these results with those from a fixed effects panel regression that 
follows counties between (calendar/tax years) 2000 and 2006.  Here some explanatory variables 
X are available at county level ij, whereas others Z are available only at state level j: 16 
 
(5)  ijt ijt jt ij ijt y XZ u β θα ′′ =+ + +   . 
Here we also include year dummies, and cluster standard errors at state level.  As before, with 
limited correlations between our heterogeneity measures, (non exceeding |.42|), we follow this 
with a specification that adds all of them simultaneously: 
(5)'  ,1 ,2 ,3 ijt ijt jt Income jt Language jt Race ijt ij ijt yX Z F F F u β θδ δ δ α ′′′ ′ ′ =+ + + + + + . 
4. Results 
  Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Tables 1 (cross section) and 2 
(panel).  We begin by examining simple correlations between each heterogeneity measure and 
non-filing rates.  Figure 1 provides scatterplots of year 2000 non-filing rates, both broadly and 
narrowly defined, for each measure at the county level.  No strong correlations appear between 
income, language or religious fragmentation and non-filing rates.  Of the four dimensions, a 
positive correlation appears only between racial fragmentation and both broad and narrow non-
filing rates.   
 [Figure 1 about here.] 
 
  More formally, for income inequality, the pairwise correlation is .35 and .42 for broad 
and narrow non-filing rates, respectively.  For language fragmentation, the correlation is .39 and 
.30, respectively, while for religious fragmentation it is -.23 and -.24, respectively.  Reducing to 
the three dimensions of heterogeneity available for 2000-2006 non-filing rates, broad and narrow 
correlations are weaker for (state level defined) income inequality at .21 and .22, respectively.  
Correlations are also weaker for (state level defined) language fragmentation, at .24 and .18, 
respectively.  However correlations are higher for (county level defined) racial fragmentation, at 
.67 and .68, respectively. 17 
 
  Similar pairwise correlations can be examined between our enforcement variables and 
non-filing rates.  Since these are available at county level for all years, we consider only the 
pooled 2000-2006 data.  For the penalty rate for non-filers, the correlation with broad and narrow 
non-filing rates is -.13 and -.14, respectively.   For the enforcement rate for non-filers, the 
correlation is -.15 and -.21, respectively.   In contrast, the audit rate for filers is positively 
correlated, at .39 for broad non-filing rates, and .44 for narrow non-filing rates.  This might 
suggest, as Dubin et al. (1990) found, that a more severe audit regime for filers can have the side 
effect of raising non-filing rates.  Finally, the correlation between the penalty rate for filing 
taxpayers and the non-filing rate is low and of an unexpected sign, at -.07 (broad non-filing) and 
-.08 (narrow non-filing).        
  To see whether these relationships between non-filing rates and either heterogeneity or 
IRS enforcement variables persist once other factors are controlled, we move next to regression 
analysis. 
  Beginning with year 2000 cross section regression, results are provided in Table 3. 
Without fragmentation measures included, we find that the broad non-filing rate in column (1) is 
rising in filed audit rates as in the simply correlation.  Of course, interpreting the role of IRS 
audit rates on non-filing rates is complicated by possible endogeneity; the IRS is likely to devote 
more enforcement resources where noncompliance is suspected.  Subsequent drafts of this paper 
will address this possibility using several potential instruments.  Surprisingly, we find that broad 
non-filing is also rising in the enforcement rate against detected non-filers.  The latter could 
reflect problems with our measure of non-filer enforcement rate for the earliest years of our 
sample (tax years 1999 to 2002), as the internal IRS data source from which we are drawing may 
not have complete taxpayer account activity that far back.  (We address this provisionally in the 18 
 
following panel regression with year dummies.)  Compared to those whose highest education is 
high school graduation, broad non-filing rates are rising in the share with some college or 
associate degree, but falling in the share with a bachelor’s degree.  Regarding age, broad non-
filing rates are increasing in the share of a county aged 45-64, and lowest for those with a large 
share of people under 20 or over 65.  Consistent with the issue of third party reporting, broad 
non-filing rates are increasing in the share of household income from self-employment (which 
must be self-reported to the IRS), rather than wages and salaries.
15  Relative to the share 
unmarried, broad non-filing rates are falling in the share currently married, but rising in the share 
widowed, divorced, or separated.   Interestingly, the non-filing rate is not affected by the share 
who speak Spanish or Other languages rather than English at home when the share foreign born 
is controlled for, but the share foreign born raises non-filing rates.  Non-filing rates are falling in 
residential stability, i.e. the median number of years individuals have lived at the same residence, 
but rising in median home value.  The latter is consistent with nominal taxes having a higher real 
cost in areas with a higher cost of living. 
        
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
The non-filing rate does not vary significantly by home ownership rates, mean household size, or 
unemployment rate.  In particular, factors germane to eligibility for the EITC, such as interaction 
between household size and income, are not significant. 
                                                      
15 For this and all following specifications we also try replacing the 8 income source share variables with the 13 
industry shares used by the census and ACS.  These are:  agriculture, construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, 
transportation, information, finance/insurance, professional, education/health/social, arts/entertainment, public 
administration, and other.  In every specification, relative to the share of the civilian labor force in agriculture, non-
filing rates are significantly different at the 5 percent of 10 percent level only in the information sector, where they 
are lower.  19 
 
  When we shift our focus to explaining variations in the narrow non-filing rate in column 
(3), our results are very similar, with the following exceptions.  The troublesome enforcement 
rate for non-filers loses significance but retains the “wrong” sign.  Those with a bachelor’s 
degree are now no more likely to file than high school graduates.  Counties with a higher share 
of income from Social Security relative to wages and salary are now less likely to file, while 
non-filing is now decreasing in the share speaking Spanish or another language at home (with the 
share foreign born controlled).  Finally, consistent with EITC eligibility, narrow non-filing rates 
are now decreasing in the share of the working age population in the civilian labor force. 
  Finally, when we add our four heterogeneity measures to either the broad (column 2) or 
narrow (column 4) non-filing specifications, the estimated effects of our non-heterogeneity 
measures remain remarkably stable.  With this as background, the effect of heterogeneity on non-
filing rates is only modest.  Broad non-filing rates (including later filers and those who, upon 
later inspection, owe no further money) is actually falling in household income inequality and 
religious fragmentation, but each is significant only at the 10 percent level.  Narrow non-filing 
rates are also falling in religious fragmentation, but no longer varying in income inequality, and 
are now rising in language fragmentation. 
  Thus, based on cross section evidence from the 2000 census year, the effects of social 
heterogeneity on non-filing rates are significant in only 4 of 8 cases; in 3 of these 4 cases 
measured heterogeneity is actually increasing filing rates.  Perhaps heterogeneity is good for 
social capital in this instance?    
  However, it is well known that in cross section regressions unmeasured influences on 
non-filing rates can cause misleading correlations between included variables.  To better control 20 
 
for those influences on non-filing that are unobserved but time invariant, we move next to fixed 
effects results.    All results are provided in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here.] 
Beginning as before with broad non-filing rates and heterogeneity excluded, we find in column 
(1) that non-filing is not affected by (slight) variations in the effective penalty rate as in cross 
section.  However non-filing is now falling in the enforcement rate for detected non-filers, in line 
with expectations.  Non-filing is now marginally rising in the effective penalty rate for filers, but 
surprisingly no longer affected by the audit rate of filed returns.  Unlike in cross section, broad 
non-filing is now falling in the share male, and no longer affected by education.  The effects of 
the age distribution is also attenuated; relative to the share of a county aged 45-64, only a rise in 
the share 15-19 lowers the non-filing rate. 
  Perhaps most surprisingly, broad non-filing rates are no longer affected by the share of a 
county’s household income that comes from self-employment rather than (third-party verified) 
wages and salaries.  This finding was robust to alternative measures of income source, such as 
the share of households reporting income from self-employment, or the share of the civilian 
labour force self-employed in private, for profit incorporated or unincorporated businesses.  
Instead, relative to the share of income from wages and salaries, broad non-filing rates differed 
only in the share coming from Social Security (lower).  Non-filing rates are also no longer 
affected by marital status shares.  With share foreign born controlled, non-filing is now 
positively associated with the share speaking Spanish at home, but only at the 10 percent level, 
while the share foreign born itself is now marginally negatively associated with non-filing.   
  In other effects, broad non-filing no longer varies significantly with real median home 
value.  Home ownership rates are now co-vary positively with non-filing, while more of the 21 
 
variables associated with EITC eligibility are now significant, including average household size, 
unemployment, and the interaction between income and household size.  The average state 
income tax rate, which could not be tested in cross section, is positively signed but insignificant.  
Thus we do not find significant evidence that residents of high income tax states avoid filing 
federally to avoid combined state and federal taxes.        
  When we again shift our focus to explaining variations in the narrow non-filing rate over 
time in column (3), our results are again generally similar, with the following exceptions.  
Narrow non-filing rates are no longer lower for share male, suggesting perhaps that female filers 
are only more likely to either file late, or not file when no income is still owed.  Also of interest, 
narrow non-filing rates are rising in real median household income, unlike broad non-filing rates.  
Similarly, while broad non-filing rates do not vary in the share of income derived from public 
assistance, narrow non-filing rates increase markedly.  Narrow non-filing is again falling in the 
share married, suggesting as with gender that married couples may simply be more likely to file 
late or neglect to file when no money is owed.  When the share foreign born is controlled, narrow 
non-filing is no longer increasing in the share speaking Spanish at home, and is falling in the 
share speaking another non-English language.  Narrow non-filing is also no longer affected by 
residential stability, nor by the share foreign born.  Conversely, narrow non-filing is falling in 
real median home value.  All other effects are qualitatively similar to those for broad non-filing.     
  Let us turn finally to addressing the effects of heterogeneity.  When we add our three 
available heterogeneity measures to either the broad (column 2) or narrow (column 4) non-filing 
specifications in Table 4, the estimated effects of our non-heterogeneity measures remain stable, 
with the exception of some of the coefficients on the language and race shares.  These are the 
shares that underlie our language and racial fragmentation measures, and thus correlation 22 
 
between these shares and their respective dispersion measures may account for this.  In 
particular, with fragmentation measures added, the share speaking Spanish at home loses its 
positive association with broad non-filing.   With this as background, we find that heterogeneity 
no longer dampens some non-filing rates as in cross section.  Instead, for both broad and narrow 
non-filing rates, income inequality and fragmentation by home language lose any effect.  In 
contrast, racial fragmentation shifts from having no effect in cross section, to having a definite 
positive association with non-filing rates under fixed effects. 
       
5. Conclusions 
  This paper has attempted to make two contributions.  First, it has joined Dubin et al. 
(1990) and Erard and Ho (2001) in providing a rare empirical study of the determinants of tax 
filing compliance in the United States.  Using individual United States tax data aggregated to 
county level for the tax years 2000 to 2006, we have found that tax non-filing rates have varied 
in ways that consistent with augmented versions of the rational compliance model.  In particular, 
fixed effects analysis suggests that non-filing rates are decreasing in the enforcement rate taken 
against detected non-filers, and increasing in the effective penalty rate applied to filed but 
misreported taxes.  Non-filing rates are also decreasing in the factors that proxy for eligibility for 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, such as household size interacted with median household income 
and the employment rate.   Non-filing rates are also increasing in home ownership rate, and 
narrow non-filing in particular is increasing in real median household income.   
  Among demographic factors, non-filing rates are decreasing in the population share of 
counties below the age of 20, or in the share of a county’s household income from Social 
Security.   While non-filing does not vary by educational achievement shares, narrow non-filing 23 
 
rates in particular are decreasing in the share married, in real median home value, and in the 
share who speak a language other than English or Spanish at home.  While broad non-filing rates 
are negatively associated with residential stability, narrow non-filing rates are less conclusively 
related.  In contrast to the findings of Dubin et al. (1990) and Erard and Ho (2001), identified 
non-filing rates did not vary with the share of income from self-employment.  While this finding 
may seem counter-intuitive because of the lack of third party verification of self-employment 
income, we would point out that the availability (lack) of third party income reports may increase 
(decrease) both the likelihood that non-filing will be detected, and that filed reported income will 
be audited.   Thus it is not clear ex ante what the effect of self-employed income should be on 
non-filing rates.   
  The second contribution of the paper has been to ask whether heterogeneity has a 
significant effect on a compulsory rather than voluntary measure of social capital, namely tax 
filing compliance.  We test whether heterogeneity according to household income, language 
spoken at home, race, or (for 2000 only) religion has any effect upon non-filing rates.  While 
cross section analysis suggests that income and religious heterogeneity might actually lower non-
filing rates, these effects were modest, and disappear in fixed effects regression that better 
accounts for unobservable influences on non-filing that are constant over time.  Instead, under 
fixed effects regression, both broadly- and narrowly- defined non-filing rates do not vary with 
heterogeneity by income or language.  But they do both increase significantly with racial 
fragmentation, even when the underlying racial shares of a county are controlled for.  
  With regards to social capital, our estimated effects of heterogeneity under panel 
regression (neutral or negative) are less cheerful than those in cross section (neutral or positive).  
Yet they are consistent with the findings of previous studies estimating the effects of racial 24 
 
heterogeneity on compulsory activities such as census return rates (Vigdor 2004), or voluntary 
activities such as volunteering, voting, or being a member of an organization (Alesina and La 
Ferrara 2000, 2002; Costa and Kahn 2003a, 2003b; Putnam 2007, Clark and Kim 2010).  On the 
other hand, it should be emphasized that various dimensions of heterogeneity are not being found 
to reduce social capital indicators, and some may in fact increase them. 
  Nonetheless, given that the United States and indeed all OECD countries are growing 
ever more racially diverse (Putnam 2007), it might be fruitful to explore ways to reduce or 
reverse the effects of this dimension of heterogeneity on both compulsory and voluntary 
indicators of social capital.  As discussed in Li (2010), tax agencies that emphasize common 
benefits from a well-functioning tax system might reduce filing noncompliance.  More broadly, 
in increasingly diverse societies, governments who are concerned with social capital may wish to 
set policies that emphasize shared citizenship, values, or identity.        25 
 
References 
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2000).  Participation in heterogeneous communities.  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (3), 847-904. 
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2002).  Who trusts others?  Journal of PublicEconomics, 
85 (2), 207-234. 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain 
Wacziarg (2003).   Fractionalization.  Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2), 155-194. 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999).  Public goods and ethnic divisions.  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (4), 1243-1284. 
Allingham, Michael and Agnar Sandmo (1972).  Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. 
Journal of Public Economics, 1 (3-4), 323-338. 
Alm, James (1999).  Tax compliance and administration.  In W. Bartley Hildreth and James A. 
Richardson (Eds.), Handbook on Taxation.  New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 741-
768. 
Alm, James (2011).  Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: Lessons from theory, 
experiments, and field studies.  International Tax and Public Finance, forthcoming. 
Alm, James, Todd Cherry, Michael Jones, and Michael McKee, M. (2010).  Taxpayer 
information assistance services and tax reporting behavior.  Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 31 (4), 577-586. 
Alm, James, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze (1999).  Changing the social norm of 
tax compliance by voting.  Kyklos, 52 (2), 141-172.  
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein (1998).  Tax compliance.  The Journal of 
Economic Literature, 36 (2), 818-860. 
Beron, Kurt, Helen Tauchen, and Ann Dryden Witte (1992).  The effect of audits and 
socioeconomic variables on compliance.  In Joel Slemrod (Ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: 
Tax Compliance and Enforcement.  Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 67-89. 
Becker, Gary S. (1968).  Crime and punishment – An economic approach.  The Journal of 
Political Economy, 76 (2), 169-217. 
Clark, Jeremy and Bonggeun Kim (2011).  The effect of neighbourhood diversity on 
volunteering: Evidence from New Zealand.  Working Paper, University of Canterbury.  
Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Costa, Dora and Matthew Kahn (2003a).  Understanding the American decline in social capital, 
1952-1998.   Kyklos, 56 (1), 17-46. 
Costa, Dora and Matthew Kahn (2003b).   Civic engagement and community heterogeneity: An 
economist’s perspective.   Perspectives on Politics, 1 (1), 103-111. 
Cowell, Frank A. (1990).  Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion.  Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Cowell, Frank A. and James P. F. Gordon (1988).  Unwillingness to pay.  Journal of Public 
Economics, 36 (3), 305-321. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A., Michael Graetz, and Louis L. Wilde (1990).  The effect of audit rates on the 
federal individual income tax, 1977-1986.   National Tax Journal, 43 (4), 395-409.  
Elster, Jon (1989).  The Cement of Society – A Study of Social Order.  Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fortin, Bernard, Guy Lacroix, and Marie-Claire Villeval (2007).  Tax evasion and social 
interactions.  Journal of Public Economics, 91 (8), 2089-2112.  26 
 
Gordon, James P. F. (1989).  Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax 
evasion.  European Economic Review, 33 (4), 797-805. 
Gneezy, Uri and Also Rustichini (2000).  A fine is a price.  Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (1, Part 
1), 1-18. 
Erard, Brian and Chih-Chin Ho (2001).  Searching for ghosts: who are the non-filers and how 
much tax do they owe?  Journal of Public Economics, 81 (1), 25-50. 
Gentry, William and Matthew Kahn (2009).  Understanding spatial variation in tax sheltering: 
The role of demographics, ideology, and taxes.   International Regional Science Review, 
32 (3), 400-423. 
Gustavsson, Magnus and Henrik Jordahl (2008).  Inequality and trust in Sweden: Some 
inequalities are more harmful than others.   Journal of Public Economics, 92 (1-2), 348-
365. 
Hisnanick, John and Annette Rogers (undated).  Household income inequality measures based on 
the ACS Data: 2000-2005.   Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Washington, D.C. 
Kim, Youngse (2003).  Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model 
of tax evasion.  Journal of Public Economics, 87 (9), 1591-1616. 
Kleven, Henrik J. Martin B. Knudsen, Claus T. Kreiner, Soren Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez 
(2011).  Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment 
in Denmark.  Econometrica, 79 (3), 651-692. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1999).   The 
quality of government.  The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15 (1) 222-
279. 
Leigh, Andrew (2006).  Trust, inequality and ethnic heterogeneity.  The Economic Record, 82, 
268-280. 
Li, Sherry Xin (2010).  Social identities, ethnic diversity, and tax morale.  Public Finance 
Review, 38 (2), 146-177. 
Luttmer, Erzo (2001).  Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution.  The Journal of Political 
Economy, 109 (3), 500-528. 
Miguel, Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005).   Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public 
goods in Kenya.   Journal of Public Economics, 89 (11-12), 2325-2368. 
Myles, Gareth D. and Robin A. Naylor (1996).  A model of tax evasion with group conformity 
and social customs.  European Journal of Political Economy, 12 (1), 49-66. 
Poterba, James M. (1997).  Demographic structure and the political economy of public 
education.  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16 (1), 48-66. 
Putnam, Robert (2007).  E pluribus unnum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century 
– The 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture.   Scandinavian Political Studies 30, 137-174. 
Sandmo, Agnar (2005).  The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view.  National Tax Journal, 
58 (4), 643-663. 
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki (2002).  Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration.  In 
Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (Eds.), Handbook of Public Economics.  
Amsterdam, London, and New York: Elsevier, 1423-1470. 
Traxler, Christian (2010).  Social corms and conditional cooperative taxpayers.  European 
Journal of Political Economy, 26 (1), 89-103. 
Vigdor, Jacob  (2004).   Community composition and collective action: Analyzing initial mail 
responses to the 2000 census.  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86 (1), 303-312. 27 
 




    
 
 
A.   Broad Non-filing Rate as a Function of          B.  Narrow Non-filing Rate as a Function of 





      
 
 
C.   Broad Non-filing Rate as a Function of          D.  Narrow Non-filing Rate as a Function of 




















    
 
 
E.   Broad Non-filing Rate as a Function of          F.  Narrow Non-filing Rate as a Function of 





     
 
 
G.  Broad Non-filing Rate as a Function of          H.  Narrow Non-filing Rate as a Function of 
       Fragmentation by Religion                        Fragmentation by Religion 29 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in 2000 Cross Section Regression  (All at County Level)
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable         N  Mean    St.Dev.   Min  Max   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Broad Non-filing Rate      3026    .0391    .0154       .0122    .1938 
Narrow Non-filing Rate    3026    .0236    .0088       .0068    .0886 
 
IRS enforcement variables not presented 
 
Share Male            3140    .4962    .0222           0       .6758 
Real Median Household Inc.  3138    36372    9005       15231   91210 
 
Educ. < High School        3140    .2262    .0876       .0304    .6530 
Educ. High School Diploma  3140    .3469    .0655       .1093    .5325 
Educ. Some College/Assoc Deg 3140    .2617    .0567       .0952    .4489 
Educ. Bachelor’s          3140    .1097    .0492             0      .4002 
Educ. Masters/PhD/Prof Deg  3140    .0555    .0329           0      .3603 
 
Share Age < 15          3139    .2063    .0283       .0205   .3809 
Share Age 15-19          3139    .0754    .0128           0      .2438 
Share Age 20-24          3139    .0602    .0253       .0137   .2918 
Share Age 25-44          3139    .2749    .0316       .1452   .4814 
Share Age 45-64          3139    .2359    .0277       .0537   .4589 
Share Age 65 Plus          3139    .1473    .0419       .0179   .3466 
 
Share of Household Income from 
Wages and Salaries          3140    .6859    .0736       .3844    .8806 
Self-employment          3140    .0762    .0368           0      .3896 
Interest/Dividends/Net Rental  3140    .0669    .0267       .0051    .2411 
Social Security          3140    .0767    .0247       .0052    .1882 
Supplemental Soc Security  3140    .0074    .0053           0      .0603 
Public Assistance          3140    .0020    .0024           0      .0639 
Retirement Funds          3140    .0605    .0238       .0030    .2524 
Other Income          3140    .0244    .0072           0      .0784 
 
Never Married          3140    .2248    .0562       .0902     .5613 
Currently Married (not sep)  3140    .5854    .0592       .1973     .8759 
Widowed/Divorced/Separated  3140    .1898    .0302       .0338     .6054 
 
Share English at Home:     3140    .8940    .1154       .0444     .9881 
Share Spanish at Home:   3140    .0624    .1037           0      .9497 
Share Other Lang. at Home:  3140    .0436    .0547           0      .7193 
 
Median Years at Residence  3140    7.249    2.195              2         18 
 
Share Foreign Born         3140    .0347    .0486              0     .5094 
 
Median Home Value        3140    84579    47730             0      1000001 
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Table 1: (Cont’d) 
Descriptive Statistics for County Level Variables in 2000 Cross Section Regression
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable         N  Mean    St.Dev.   Min  Max   
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Share White Non-Hispanic  3139    .8221    .1911        .0210    .9974 
Share White Hispanic        3139    .0589    .1181           0     .9693 
Share Black Non-Hispanic  3139    .0878    .1452           0     .8601 
Share Black Hispanic       3139    .0015    .0033           0     .1104 
Share Amer Ind/Alaskan Nat  3139    .0198    .0778              0  .9503 
Share Asian           3139    .0091    .0247              0  .5860 
Share Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 3139    .0009    .0090            0   .4345 
 
Share Mainline Protestant  3139    .1413  .1125       0  .8188 
Share Evangelical Protestant  3139    .2266  .1675               0     .9833 
Share Catholic      3139    .1363  .1471       0     .8999 
Share Orthodox     3139    .0009    .0060                  0  .1914 
Share Other Religions    3139    .0234  .0846       0  .9157 
Share Unclaimed Adherents  3139    .4714  .1811       0     .9818 
 
Home Ownership Rate     3140    .7394    .0777           0    .8954 
Average Household Size  3140    2.538    .2040         1.28     4.38 
 
Unemployment Rate (x 100)  3140    4.764    2.618            0        27.6 
Share Civ Pop in Labor Force  3139    .7359    .1123            0     1.5633 
 
Fragmentation by 
  Household Income (Gini)  3140    .4342    .0388       .3152   .6085 
  Language spoken at home  3140    .1679    .1138       .0235   .6554 
  Race              3139    .2342    .1856       .0053   .7493 
  Religion            3139    .5850    .0985       .0328   .7681 
 
Share of Civ Lab Force in 
  Agric/Fishing/Forest/Mining  3140    .0723    .0763            0   .5819 
  Construction          3140    .0771    .0240        .0107    .2414 
  Manufacturing          3140    .1581    .0914            0     .4855 
  Wholesale            3140    .0298    .0114           0     .1332 
  Retail            3140    .1148    .0207            0     .2690 
  Transportation          3140    .0549    .0189            0     .2605 
  Information          3140    .0187    .0103            0     .1073 
  Finance            3140    .0455    .0187            0     .2071 
  Professional          3140    .0528    .0265            0     .2347 
  Education/Health/Social  3140    .2028    .0443        .0655    .4706 
  Arts/Entertainment         3140    .0712    .0332            0     .3645 
  Other              3140    .0478    .0095            0     .0975 





Descriptive Statistics for County and State Level Variables in 2000-2006 Panel Regression
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable         N  Mean  St.Dev.    Min   Max  State or County Level? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Broad Non-filing Rate       21132  .0354  .0143  .0066  .2051  County  
Narrow Non-filing Rate    21127  .0208  .0086  .0041  .0886  County 
 
IRS enforcement variables not presented 
 
Share Male           21982  .4966  .0208        0  .7010  County 
Real Median Household Inc.  21987  33702  8658.0        0  88243  County 
 
Educ.  <  High  School    21987  .1650 .0431 .0858 .2590 State 
Educ.    High  School  Diploma  21987  .3109 .0399 .1932 .4269 State 
Educ.  Some  College/Assoc  Deg  21987  .2771 .0321 .1685 .3839 State 
Educ.  Bachelor’s      21987  .1612 .0261 .0891 .2312 State 
Educ.  Masters/PhD/Prof  Deg  21987  .0857 .0191 .0543 .2599 State 
 
Share Age < 15     21980  .1974  .0294        0  .3834  County 
Share Age 15-19    21980  .0741  .0120        0  .2438  County 
Share Age 20-24    21980  .0680  .0225        0  .3339  County 
Share  Age  25-44    21980  .2631 .0351 .1271 .4814 County 
Share  Age  45-64    21980  .2491 .0303 .0492 .6396 County 
Share  Age  65  Plus    21980  .1483 .0414 .0149 .3522 County 
 
Share of Household Income from 
  Wages and Salaries    21987  .7489  .0287  .6442  .8006  State 
    Self-employment    21987  .0656 .0155 .0379 .1311 State 
    Interest/Dividends/Net  Rental  21987  .0486 .0103 .0286 .0969 State 
    Social  Security    21987  .0619 .0131 .0230 .1085 State 
  Supplemental Soc Security  21987  .0046  .0018  .0017  .0119  State 
    Public  Assistance    21987  .0011 .0005 .0003 .0052 State 
    Retirement  Funds    21987  .0496 .0089 .0308 .0770 State 
    Other  Income      21987  .0198 .0030 .0116 .0300 State 
 
Never  Married        21987  .2648 .0254 .2136 .5402 State 
Currently  Married  (not  sep)  21987  .5478 .0262 .2695 .6086 State 
Widowed/Divorced/Separated 21987  .1874 .0164 .1310 .2327 State 
 
Speak  English  at  Home    21987  .8787 .0963 .5747 .9791 State 
Speak  Spanish  at  Home    21987  .0739 .0812 .0060 .2923 State 
Speak Other Lang. at Home  21987  .0474  .0293  .0087  .2486  State 
 







Table 2 (Cont’d): 
Descriptive Statistics for County and State Level Variables in 2000-2006 Panel Regression
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________  
Variable         N  Mean  St.Dev.    Min   Max  State or County Level? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Share  Foreign  Born    21987  .0720 .0562 .0083 .2724 State 
 
Real  Median  Home  Value  21987 116471  47711 69679 442696  State 
 
Share  White  Non-Hispanic  21980  .8153 .1932 .0202 .9986 County 
Share White Hispanic    21980  .0635  .1208        0  .9693  County 
Share Black Non-Hispanic  21980  .0885  .1454        0  .8674  County 
Share Black Hispanic    21980  .0017  .0034        0  .1180  County 
Share Amer Ind/Alaskan Nat  21980  .0201  .0780        0  .9507  County 
Share Asian      21980  .0101  .0255        0  .5860  County 
Share Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 21980  .0009  .0085        0  .4470  County 
 
Home  Ownership  Rate    21987  .6857 .0395 .3863 .7665 State 
Average  Household  Size  21980  2.135 .3423 .5015 5.005 County 
 
Unemployment Rate (x100)  21971  5.489  2.512        0   27.6  County 
Share Civ Pop in Labor Force  21980  .7386  .1117        0  1.636  County 
 
Average State Income Tax Rate 21987  .0195  .0107        0  .0432  State 
 
Fragmentation by 
  Household Income (Gini)  21987  .4443  .0191  .3841  .5448  State 
  Language spoken at home  21987  .2034  .1324   .0412  .5692  State 
    Race        21980  .2431 .1863 .0028 .7550 County 
 
Share of Civ Lab Force in 
  Agric/Fishing/Forest/Mining  21983    .0277    .0207   .0002    .1220  State 
  Construction         21983    .0743    .0111   .0272    .1216  State 
  Manufacturing         21983    .1317    .0417   .0102    .2416  State 
  Wholesale           21983    .0357    .0045   .0065    .0474  State 
  Retail            21983    .1191    .0065   .0507    .1538  State 
  Transportation         21983    .0531    .0079   .0304    .0952  State 
  Information           21983    .0250    .0063   .0132    .0725  State 
  Finance/Real Estate        21983    .0656    .0105   .0381    .1284  State 
  Professional         21983    .0855    .0193   .0500    .2105  State 
  Education/Health/Social  21983    .2048    .0192   .1158    .2617  State 
  Arts/Entertainment        21983    .0808    .0160   .0573    .2678  State 
  Other|           21983    .0479    .0041   .0329    .1015  State 





Determinants of non-filing rates: cross section regression for Census Year 2000 (N = 2,265 counties)
1 
 
       (1)      (2)      (3)       (4)  






Narrow Non-filing  











***  (.016) 
 
  .088
***  (.017) 
        
Penalty Rate Nonfilers 
 
-.003       (.003)    -.003     (.003)        -.002       (.002)   -.002     (.002) 
Enforcement Rt Nonfilers  
 
  .071
***  (.022)               .068
*** (.023)   .009       (.006)     .009    (.006) 
Penalty Rate Filers    .003       (.008)    .001     (.008)   .002       (.005)     .002    (.005) 
Audit Rate Filers    .244
**    (.107)    .256
**  (.104)   .103
***   (.035)           .106
***  (.036) 
Share Male    .025       (.020)    .021     (.020)   .007       (.011)    .005      (.011) 
Median HH Income  -.000       (.000)  -.000     (.000)  -.000       (.000)    -.000     (.000) 
Education < High School 
                Some College 
                Bachelors 
                Masters/PhD 
 
-.010        (.009) 
 .019
***    (.007) 
-.046
**     (.022) 
 .042         (.039) 




**  (.019) 
 .049     (.041) 
-.002       (.004) 
 .011
***   (.004) 
-.005       (.006) 
-.007       (.007) 
  -.003    (.005) 
   .009
**  (.004) 
 -.006     (.006) 
 -.007     (.007) 
Age Shares  Under 15 
                   15-19 
                   20-24 
                   25-44 
                   65 Plus 
 
-.056
**     (.028) 
-.199
***   (.046) 
-.100
***   (.028) 
-.075
***   (.021) 
-.155
***   (.025) 
 
-.061










***  (.013) 
-.113
***  (.026) 
-.053
***  (.015) 
-.044
***  (.011) 
-.092
***  (.013) 
-.041
***  (.013) 
-.117
***  (.027) 
-.052
***  (.016) 
-.042
***  (.011) 
-.086
***   (.013) 
Share of HH Income from  
            Self-employment 
            Interest/Div/Rent 
            Social Security  
            Supplemental SS 
            Public Assistance 
            Retirement Funds 
            Other Sources 
 
   
  .065
***  (.012) 
  .028
**    (.013) 
  .038       (.032) 
 -.091      (.104) 
  .136       (.277) 
  .014       (.014) 






  .009     (.034) 
-.024      (.110) 
  .219     (.304) 
  .015     (.015) 
-.029     (.051) 
   
  .041
***  (.007) 
  .011
*     (.006) 
  .058
***  (.017) 
-.110
*     (.061) 
  .228      (.164) 
  .011      (.007) 
  .004      (.025) 
  
 .037
***  (.007) 
 .009      (.007) 
 .055
***  (.017) 
-.101      (.063) 
 .271     (.179) 
 .011     (.007) 






***  (.015) 
 .044
*      (.026) 
 
-.072
***  (.016) 
  .048
*    (.026) 
 
-.046
***  (.009) 
 .027





*    (.015) 
 
Speak Spanish at Home 
Speak Other Lng at Home 
                                   
-.022       (.021) 
-.004       (.008)     
 
 
-.010      (.025) 
-.017      (.013) 
 
-.027
***  (.010) 
-.007
*     (.004) 
 




Median Yrs at Residence  -.001
***  (.000) 
 
-.001
***  (.000)  -.001
***  (.000)  -.001
*** (.000) 34 
 
Table 3 (Cont’d): 
Determinants of non-filing rates: cross section regression for Census Year 2000 (N = 2,265 counties) 
 
       (1)      (2)      (3)       (4)  
Variable 






Narrow Non-filing  
Rate + Fragmentation 
 
Share Foreign Born 
 
 





***  (.012) 
 
  .000






***  (.003) 
 
.000















***  (.007) 
 
  .000




       
Home Ownership Rate  
 
  .002     (.008)   .003      (.009)   .004       (.004)    .005       (.004) 




Share in civ. Lab Force 
 -.000      (.000) 
 
 -.005      (.003) 
 .000      (.000) 
 
-.005
*    (.003) 
-.000      (.000)  
 
-.003
**   (.002)       
-.000        (.000) 
 
-.003
**     (.002) 
 
 




          HH Income (Gini) 
          Language   
          Race
2 
          Religion
2 
 
      R
2 
 
          N 
 
   







       
         .805 
 
        2265 
 
  




*    (.017) 
 .011      (.008) 
 .001      (.004) 
-.005
*    (.003) 
 
      .807 
 
     2265 
 
 .000








         .818 
 
         2265 
  
 .000       (.000) 
 
 
  .002       (.006) 
  .009
**    (.004) 
  .001       (.002) 
 -.003
**   (.001) 
 
         .819 
 
         2265 
1  Run on Stata 10.0.  Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.   
*, 
**, and 
*** refer to two tailed 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  State dummies included, but not reported. 
 
2  The underlying share variables for the race and religion fragmentation indexes were included as control 
variables.  For religion, the share variables included Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Catholic, Orthodox, 
and Other Religion, with non-adherents the omitted share.  For race, the share variables included White 
Hispanic, Black NonHispanic, Black Hispanic, American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, and Hawaiian/ 
Pacific Islander, with White NonHispanic the omitted group. 35 
 
Table 4: 
Determinants of non-filing rates: fixed effects panel regression for 2000-2006
1 
 
       (1)      (2)      (3)       (4)  
Variable 






Narrow Non-filing  





**   (.040) 
 
  .101
**  (.040) 
 
 .033
*      (.017) 
 
  .035
**  (.016) 
        
Penalty Rate Nonfilers 
 
 .000       (.000)     .000     (.000)         .000       (.000)    .000     (.000) 
Enforcement Rt Nonfilers  
 
-.008
**    (.003)             -.008
**   (.003)   -.003
***  (.001)        -.003
*** (.001) 
Penalty Rate Filers    .001
*     (.000)    .001
*    (.000)    .000
*     (.000)    .000
**   (.000) 
Audit Rate Filers    .045       (.035)    .049     (.034)   -.007      (.016)         -.004     (.015) 
Share Male   -.039
**    (.019)  -.041
**   (.020)   -.010      (.009)   -.010     (.009) 
Real Median HH Income    .000     
   (.000)   .000    
  (.000)   .000
***   (.000)    .000
***  (.000) 
Education < High School
2 
                Some College
2 
                Bachelors
2 
                Masters/PhD
2 
 
 -.022       (.023) 
  .012        (.022) 
 -.012       (.063) 
 -.009       (.045) 
-.026     (.021) 
 .003     (.022) 
-.018     (.061) 
-.015     (.045) 
 -.012      (.009) 
  .010      (.011) 
 -.016      (.015) 
  .010      (.017) 
 
 -.014     (.008) 
   .007    (.011) 
 -.018     (.014) 
   .004    (.016) 
Age Shares  Under 15 
                   15-19 
                   20-24 
                   25-44 
                   65 Plus 
 
-.039       (.026) 
-.062
**     (.026) 
-.004        (.013) 
 .003        (.015) 
 .009        (.019) 
 
-.034      (.018) 
-.071
**   (.027) 
-.004      (.014) 
  .001     (.015) 
  .011     (.016) 
-.026
**     (.011) 
-.025
*        (.014) 
  .004       (.007) 
  .002       (.008) 
  .016       (.011) 
 
-.024
**   (.011) 
-.028
*    (.015) 
  .003     (.007) 
  .007     (.008) 
  .017   
   (.011) 
Share HH Income from
2 
            Self-employment 
            Interest/Div/Rent 
            Social Security  
            Supplemental SS 
            Public Assistance 
             Retirement Funds 
            Other Sources 
 
  
  .012       (.027) 
 -.006       (.024) 
 -.127
*     (.064) 
 -.494       (.437) 
  2.76       (1.75) 
 -.047       (.050) 
  .002       (.087) 
  
  .016     (.026) 
 -.003     (.024) 
- .133
**  (.065) 
 -.500     (.436) 
  2.65     (1.69) 
 -.042     (.049) 
 -.003     (.089) 
   
  .003      (.008) 
  .006      (.014) 
 -.086
**   (.034) 
  .203      (.147) 
  .609
**   (.263) 
 -.014      (.024) 
  .043      (.036) 
  
  .005     (.010) 
  .007     (.014) 
 -.087
**  (.033) 
  .202     (.149) 
  .585
**   (.249) 
 -.013     (.024) 







 -.031      (.033) 
 -.063      (.042) 
 
 -.037     (.034) 
 -.067     (.044) 
 
-.022
**    (.011) 




  (.012) 
-.010     (.015) 
 
Speak Spanish at Home
2 
Speak Oth Lan at Home
2 
                          
  .128
*    (.068) 
  .014
      (.077)     
 
 
 .019      (.063) 
-.117      (.083) 
 
-.016       (.025) 
-.037
**    (.015)     
 
 
-.030      (.035) 
-.054
*        (.032) 
 
Sh Same Res Year Ago
2 
-.046
**    (.018) 
 
-.051
***  (.018)  -.015       (.009) 
 
-.016
*     (.010) 36 
 
Table 4 (Cont’d): 
Determinants of non-filing rates: fixed effects panel regression for 2000-2006
1 
 
       (1)      (2)      (3)       (4)  
Variable 






Narrow Non-filing  






Real Med Home Value
2 
   
 
 -.202
*    (.120) 
 
  .000     (.000)       
 
-.200
*    (.119) 
 
 .000      (.000)     
 
 -.012
      (.025) 
 
 -.000
**  (.000)       
 
 -.009      (.024) 
 
 -.000





**   (.013)   .056
*** (.013)    .027
***  (.009)    .029
***  (.008) 
Ave HH Size     .008
* 
   (.004)   .007
*    (.004)     .006
***  (.002)    .006
***  (.002) 
Unemployment Rate    .000
***  (.000)   .000
*** (.000)     .000
***  (.000)    .000
***  (.000) 
Share in civ. Lab Force 
 
Median HH Income X 
AveHH Size 
 




          HH Income (Gini)
2 
          Language
2   
          Race
3 
           
      R
2 within 
      R
2 between 
      R
2 overall 
 
          N 
 
 
 -.000      (.001) 
 
 -.000
**   (.000) 
 





       
          
         .608 
         .054 
         .097 
        
        18341 
 
 .000     (.001) 
 
-.000
*   (.000) 
 
 .177     (.112) 
 
 
 -.004      (.017) 
  .080
       (.058) 
  .038
***  (.012) 
 
       .611 
       .117 
       .158 
      
    18341 
   -.000     (.001) 
 
   -.000
*** (.000) 
 






        
           .660 
           .097 
           .135 
         
         18341 
 -.000      (.001) 
 
 -.000
***  (.000) 
 
   .025      (.043) 
  
 
 -.002       (.009) 
  .010       (.019) 
  .020
***   (.007)  
         
         .661 
         .159 
         .193 
 
       18341 




refer to two tailed significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.  Year dummies included but 
not reported. 
2   Refers to variables available only at the state, rather than county, level. 
3  The underlying share variables for the race fragmentation index were included as control variables.  
Specifically, these included White Hispanic, Black NonHispanic, Black Hispanic, American 
Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, and Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander, with White NonHispanic the omitted group. 37 
 
Appendix: Variables, Definitions, and Sources 
 
 
Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
IRS VARIABLES:  Source: All IRS-provided variables are aggregated at the county level 
from internal IRS data and censored if fewer than 10 observations per 
county-year. 
 
NON-FILING RATE  Both the broad and narrow non-filing rates are calculated by taking the 
number of non-filers (defined below) and dividing by the number of 
individuals who are identified as either filers or non-filers.  This 
denominator is calculated as the sum of the number of non-filers, the 
number of filed returns by single and married-filing-separately taxpayers, 
and two times the number of filed returns by married-filing-jointly 
taxpayers. 
 
FILERS  The total number of filed individual income tax returns for each county 
by tax year for 2000-2006.  For purposes of creating the non-filing rates 
described above, counts were provided separately by filing status. 
 
BROAD NON-FILING RATE  Both the broad and narrow definitions of non-filers are based on the set 
NARROW NON-FILING RT  of individuals that IRS identified as not appearing on a tax return for the 
given tax year despite having filed a return in previous years and/or 
having third-party-provided information documents that indicate a filing 
requirement.  “Broad non-filers” exclude deceased individuals from the 
set of IRS-identified non-filers.  “Narrow non-filers” further excludes 
individuals who were late-filers, and are further limited to those who the 
IRS expected to have a positive balance due based on Information 
Returns Processing.  County-level data for 1999-2006. 
 
 
ENFORCEMENT RATE   The ratio of the number of Delinquent Returns established by IRS in the 
NON-FILERS  previous calendar year over the (broad or narrow) number of IRS-
identified non-filers for the prior tax year.  The establishment of the 
delinquent return indicates the beginning of the enforcement process for 
nonfilers.  County-level data for 1999-2005. 
 
AUDIT RATE FILERS   The ratio of the number of individual income tax audits that began in the 
previous calendar year over the number of filed returns in the prior tax 
year.  County-level data for 1999-2005. 
 
PENALTY RT NON-FILERS  Average net penalties and interest assessed as a fraction of tax liability 
for taxpayers with delinquent returns.  County-level data on a fiscal year 






Appendix (Cont’d):  Definition of Variables   
 
 
Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
PENALTY RATE FILERS  Average net penalties and interest assessed as a fraction of tax liability 
for all other taxpayers (excluding those with delinquent returns).   







HH INCOME GINI    GINI coefficient of inequality of household income.     
 
    Source:  2000-2005  annual  data  at  state level constructed from American  
        Community Survey data by Hisnanick and Rogers (undated).  2006 at  
        state level from the American Community Survey, B19083.  2000 data at 
        county level from the United States Census, customized data kindly  
        provided by the US Census Bureau. 
 
RACE        Fragmentation measure based on the seven shares si of the population  
        of identifying exclusively as white non-Hispanic, white Hispanic, black  
    non-Hispanic,  black  Hispanic,  Native American, Asian, or Hawaiian/  
    Pacific  Islander.    Calculated  2000 – 2006 annually at county level as  










LANGUAGE AT HOME  Fragmentation measure for shares si of population over 5 speaking  









    Calculated at state level annually for 2000-2006, and county level for  
    2000. 
 
SPEAK ENGLISH V WELL  Fragmentation measure for shares si of population over 5 speaking  
        English very well, speaking Spanish but not English very well, and  









    
Calculated at state level annually for 2000-2006, and county level for  
    2000. 
 
RELIGION       Fragmentation measure based on the six shares si of adherents of    
        mainline Protestant, evangelical, Catholic, orthodox, other, and    











Appendix (Cont’d):  Definition of Variables   
 
 
Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 




WHITE NON-HISPANIC  Annual estimated share of county identifying as white non-Hispanic,   
WHITE  HISPANIC    white Hispanic, black or African American non Hispanic, black or 
BLACK NON-HISPANIC  African-American  Hispanic, Native American or Alaskan, Asian, or 
BLACK HISPANIC    Hawaiian or Pacific Islander.  Estimated share identifying as “2 or more 
AMER IND/ALASKAN NAT  races” excluded. 
A S I A N       
HAWAIIAN/PACIFIC IS  Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of  




SPEAK ENGLISH AT HOME  Share speaking English, Spanish or Other Language at home, from the  
SPEAK SPANISH AT HOME  population 5 and over. 
SPEAK OTHER LANG HOME 
    Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 P034, 2004-2006 B06007 
 
   
SP ENG VERY WELL   Share of population 5 and over who speak English as native language or 
SP SPAN; ENG NOT V WELL as second language but who speak it “Very Well.”  Share of population 5  
SP OTH; ENG NOT V WELL  and over who speak Spanish as native language, and who speak English  
        less than “Very Well.”  Share of population 5 and over who speak Other  
    language  as  native  language,  and  who speak English less than “Very  
    W e l l . ”  
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 P034, 2004-2006 B06007 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME  Real median household income deflated using the national CPI-U with  
    1999=100. 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 40 
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Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
Religion Adherents:    Share of each county in 2000 estimated to be adherents at mainline   
MAINLINE PROTESTANT  Protestant churches, evangelical churches, a Roman Catholic church,  
EVANGELICAL    an Orthodox church, another religious body, or to be unclaimed as an 
CATHOLIC      adherent (the residual).  In part because adherents of reporting churches    
ORTHODOX      may live across county lines, 39 counties report adherents exceeding    
OTHER  RELIGION    their populations, which presumably understates adherents in   
UNCLAIMED      adjacent counties. Rather than omit these counties, we redistribute their 
        negative UNCLAIMED shares to their other categories in proportion to  
        their normalized adherents shares.  Thus shares sum to 1 in all counties.  
 
        Source:  2000 county data on unadjusted adherents comes from the  
        Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), collected by the  
    Association  of  Statisticians  of  American Religious Bodies.  Members of 
    African American denominations and other religious bodies are thought  
        to be undercounted, and the “unclaimed” adherents are thought to  





POVERTY RATE    Percentage of individuals defined to be in poverty. 
 
        Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  Percentage of labour force aged 16+ who are unemployed. 
 
        Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
SHARE MALE     Share of normally resident population male.   
 
        Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  





Appendix (Cont’d):  Definition of Variables   
 
 





SHARE AGE < 15    Share of normally resident population aged under 15, 15-19, 20-24, 25-  
SHARE AGE 15-19    44, 45-64 or 65 & Over.  Males and females summed. 
SHARE AGE 20-24 
SHARE AGE 25-44    Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level, from the Area Resource    
SHARE AGE 45-64    File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human 
SHARE 65 & OVER    Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of 
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
 
SHARE FOREIGN BORN  Foreign born not of American parents/Total Population 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 P038, 2004-2006 B05002 
 
 
CITIZENSHIP RATE    Not a US citizen/Total Population 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  





EDUC < HIGH SCHOOL  Sum of male and female in each category of highest educational  
EDUC HIGH SCHOOL DIP  attainment divided by total population.  “Some College” includes  
EDUC SOME COLLEGE  associate degrees. 
EDUC BACHELOR’S 
EDUC MASTERS/PH.D/PROF Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed  2000-2003 PCT034, 2004-2006 B15002 
 
 
AVE HOUSEHOLD SIZE  Average household size.  Constructed as the difference between the  
    estimated  total  population  and  population in group quarters, divided by  
        the estimated number of housing units.   
 
        Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 42 
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Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
Distribution of HH Size: 
1 PERSON      Share of households in each county in 2000 with 1 person, 2 people, 3  
2 PEOPLE      people, 4 people, 5 people, or 6 or more people. 
3 PEOPLE 
4 PEOPLE      Source: 2000 data at county level from the Area Resource File (ARF)  
5 PEOPLE      Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
6 OR MORE PEOPLE    Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health 
    Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
 
MEDIAN HOME VALUE  Real median value of owner occupied housing units.  Nominal values   
        deflated by annual average CPI-U (1999 = 100). 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  Constructed 2000-2003 H074, 2004-2006 B25077 
        2000 data at county level, undeflated, from the Area Resource File  
        (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
 
HOME OWNERSHIP RATE  Share of occupied housing units that are owner occupied rather than  
    renter  occupied. 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 H035, 2004-2006 B25038 
 
 
MORTGAGE    Percentage  of  all housing units with a mortgage, contract to purchase, or  
    s i m i l a r   d e b t .    
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 H078, 2004-2006 B25081 
            
 
SAME RES YR AGO    Percentage of the population 1 year and over who resided 1) in the same   
DIFF RES US YR AGO  residence one year ago, 2) in a different residence in the United States  
DIFF RES NOT US YR AGO  one year ago, or 3) in a different residence outside the United States one 
    year ago. 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
    Community  Survey.    Constructed  2000-2003  P041,  2004-2006  B07202 43 
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Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
MEDIAN YEAR IN RES  Median number of years householder has resided in current residence. 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States  
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 H36, 2004-2006 B25039 
 
 
POPULATION DENSITY  Population per square mile annually at county level, defined as county  
        population estimate divided by square miles in 2000. 
 
        Source: 1999-2006 Area Resource File (ARF) Access System 2009- 
        2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and 
    Services  Administration,  Bureau  of Health Professions, Rockville, MD.  
     
 
SH CIV POP IN LAB FORCE  Share of population aged 15-64 in the civilian labour force. Estimated as  
        population in the civilian labour force aged 16+, divided by share of the  
        estimated total population aged 15-64.  
 
        Source: 1999-2006 annual data at county level from the Area Resource  
        File (ARF) Access System 2009-2010.  US Dept. of Health and Human  
        Services, Health Resources and  Services Administration, Bureau of  
    Health  Professions,  Rockville,  MD. 
 
 
STATE INC TAX RATE  Average state level individual income tax rate, defined as total state  
        individual income tax divided by total state personal income. 
 
        Source:  2000-2006 fiscal year state level data on total state personal  
        income  from the Bureau of Economic Analysis       
    http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/drill.cfm.  2000-2006 fiscal year state  
        level data on total state individual income tax kindly provided as   
        customized order from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State  
    and  Local  Government  Finances  and Census of Governments 1999-2006.  
 
 
STATE/LOC TAX BURDEN  Annual state level per capita tax burden from in-state and out-of-state  
        state and local taxes.  (Divides total state and local taxes paid by average  
        per capita income at state level). 
 
        Source:  2000-2006 annual state level data calculated by The Tax  
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Variable:    Definition  and  Source 
 
 
Share of Aggregate Household Income By Source: 
 
WAGES AND SALARIES  Percentage of households reporting income from 1) wage or salary,  
SELF-EMPLOYMENT   2) self-employment, 3) interest, dividends or net rental, 4) social security, 
INT/DIV/NET RENTAL  5) supplementary social security, 6) public assistance, 7) retirement  
SOCIAL SECURITY    income sources, or 8) other sources.  Or, percentage of aggregate  
SUPPLEMENTAL SOC SEC  household income in a region from these sources. 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
RETIREMENT FUNDS  Source:2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American 
OTHER      Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States 





AGRICULTURE    Percentage of civilian population 16 years and over employed in these  
CONSTRUCTION    industries.  Shares sum to 100%. 
MANUFACTURING 
WHOLESALE     Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American 
RETAIL      Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States 











Class of Worker: 
 
EMP W/S PVT PR    Percentage of civilian population 16 years and over who are: 1)  
EMP W/S PVT NON-PR    employed wage or salary workers in private, for profit firms, 2)  
SELF-EMP PVT PR INC  employed wage or salary workers in private, non-profit firms, 3)  
SELF-EMP PVT PR NONINC  self-employed workers in incorporated private, for-profit firms, 4) 
GOV’T WORKER    self-employed workers in non-incorporated private, for-profit firms, 5) 
UNPAID FAM WORKER  employees of the federal, state or local government, and 6) unpaid family 
    w o r k e r s .  
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States 
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 P068, 2004-2006 B24080 45 
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NEVER MARRIED    Percentage of the population 15 years and over whose current marital  
NOW MARRIED    status is 1) never married, 2) currently married and spouse not absent  
WID/DIV/SEPARATED  because of separation, or 3) widowed/divorced/separated. 
 
        Source: 2000-2006 annual data at state level from the American   
        Community Survey.  2000 data at county level from the United States 
    Census.    Constructed 2000-2003 P031, 2004-2006 B12001 
 
 
 